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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law practice is the occupation and preoccupation of sev-
eral thousand lawyers and economists across the United States. What
they do from day to day consumes the attention of several thousand busi-
ness executives on the receiving end of antitrust trouble. It was a matter
of some interest in many boardrooms when, last May, one admitted anti-
trust wrongdoer (the ringleader of a worldwide conspiracy to raise vita-
min prices) accepted a spectacular $500 million fine and one of its top
executives agreed to serve time in prison.'
Too few of us stop often enough to reflect on the history of this
distinctly American enterprise and the core values that are its roots. Last
year provided ample opportunity with the publication of formidable new
biographies of John D. Rockefeller and J.P. Morgan2 that one could read
simultaneously with front-page coverage of dramatic developments
throughout the Microsoft trial.3 One of the burning questions of the mo-
1 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, F. HOFFMAN-LAROCHE AND BASF AGREE TO PAY
RECORD CRIMINAL FINES FOR PARTICIPATING IN INTERNATIONAL VITAMIN
CARTEL (May 10, 1999). See also Steven D. Moore, Scandal Likely to Cost Roche $1
Billion, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1999, at A20.
2 RON CHERNOW, TITAN (1998); JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN (1999).
3 United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C., filed May 28, 1998).
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ment is whether the 1911 Standard Oil breakup and the 1984 AT&T
breakup are apt models for the future of what many people see as the
most notorious and dangerous monopoly of our age.
Controversial at its inception eleven decades ago, antitrust policy
remains controversial to this day and there is considerable debate over
what it should be in the years ahead. This debate, however, is too impor-
tant to be the sole preserve of antitrust specialists. Indeed, antitrust de-
velopments are appearing with increasing frequency on the front pages of
our major newspapers and on evening TV news programs. The time has
come to demystify this subject and thereby invite a broader, more open
dialogue about the role that antitrust policy should play in our society.
I. IN THE BEGINNING
I first learned about antitrust in the always-exciting and always-pro-
vocative American History classroom of Professor Robert Huff at Hobart
and William Smith Colleges in the mid-1960s. Somehow it seemed that
he actually knew those Robber Barons who dominated the scene from
the Civil War to World War I.4 He certainly brought them to life and
made vivid the fear and alarm that their unbridled power unleashed
throughout the country. They were the builders of the great trusts that
monopolized whole industries, stifled individual opportunity and initia-
tive and indeed threatened democracy itself. Professor Huff made us see
and appreciate the antitrust movement as the inevitable response of a
country with a deep aversion to concentrations of power of all kinds and
a deep commitment to both individual and business freedom. It was a
fundamentally political response to perceived abuses pervading the trans-
formation from a local agrarian to a national industrial economy. (We
will later get to the relevance of this background to today's transforma-
tion from a national industrial to a global information economy.)
Both John Sherman, the Senator who fathered the Sherman Anti-
trust Act of 1890, and Benjamin Harrison, the President who signed it
into law, were pro-business conservative Republicans who saw the need
for this legislation as a safeguard for the free-enterprise system.5 There
4 Among assigned readings that surely remain on the minds of countless Huff students
was MATITHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934).
5 As Senator Sherman warned his colleagues, "the popular mind is agitated with
problems that may disturb the social order" such as, in particular, inequities of wealth and
combinations of capital so great that they threatened to produce "a trust for every production
and a master to fix the price for every necessity of life." Congress, he continued, must heed
the appeal of the voters "or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and the nihilist. Society
is now disturbed by forces never felt before." 21 CONG. REC. 3, 2460 (1890) (Statement of
Sen. Sherman). Eighty-two years later, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall would ap-
plaud the antitrust laws generally and the Sherman Act in particular as "the Magna Carta of
free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
SHiFTING SANDS OF ANTrrRUST POLICY
are two rather simple prohibitions in this Act. First, Section 1 of the Act
declared that in all agreements, combinations and conspiracies in re-
straint of trade are unlawful. Section 2 made unlawful the monopoliza-
tion or attempted monopolization of any part of trade or commerce. The
courts were left to interpret and apply these prohibitions to the whole
array of common and uncommon business practices, arrangements and
transactions throughout the economy.
The courts quickly determined that the first prohibition did not re-
ally make illegal all concerted action in restraint of trade but only con-
certed action in "unreasonable" restraint of trade. How and where to
draw the line between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade
was hotly debated at the turn of the 19th century and remains so as we
now begin the 21st century. Teddy Roosevelt popularized the notion that
the second prohibition did not make illegal all monopolies but only
"bad" ones. Again, how to distinguish between good and bad monopo-
lies remains a lively debate spanning the turn of two centuries.
The fault lines were clear by 1912 when Woodrow Wilson and
Louis Brandeis captured the prevailing mood of the country with their
attacks upon "the curse of bigness."'6 It was clear to them that the line
between reasonable and unreasonable agreements was determined by the
size of the parties to the collaboration: trade associations among small
businesses should be free of any antitrust constraint; industrial giants had
no justification for getting together, and bigness was bad in and of itself.
New laws were needed because conservative courts and a Justice Depart-
ment too much under the thumb of big business were not protecting local
entrepreneurs from the tyranny and predations of all-powerful national
rivals. In any contest between "consumer" interests in "efficient" organi-
zation of vast new industries and "small business" interests in maintain-
ing their entrepreneurial freedom, antitrust policy should favor the latter
without any question.
Populist sentiment enabled Wilson to win the election that year, and
two years later Congress enacted two new statutes. The Federal Trade
Commission Act established an "independent" administrative agency-
supposedly independent of political influence-with a mandate to pre-
vent all "unfair methods of competition." The Clayton Act declared un-
lawful corporate mergers and stock acquisitions where the effect "may"
be substantially "to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal free-
doms." United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
6 That was a phrase popularized by Brandeis in his writings on the "trust" problem, but
Wilson captured the idea behind it in his campaign speeches. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW,
PROPHETS OF REGULATION 94-114 (1984); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL TRADITION 327-36 (1948).
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any line of commerce in any section of the country."'7 The Clayton Act
also provided new weapons against such practices as coerced exclusive
dealing, "tying" arrangements and price discrimination; and it enhanced
the standing of private parties injured by these and other antitrust viola-
tions to bring their own suits for treble damages and injunctive relief.
II. RETREAT AND DISENCHANTMENT
This new burst of antitrust enthusiasm soon took a back seat to the
imperatives of World War I, followed by a decade of big-business-boost-
ing Republican rule that then cascaded into the Great Depression of
1929. Economic misery throughout the 1930s undercut faith in the free-
enterprise system. Antitrust appeared little more than an inadequate
band-aid for a fundamentally flawed organization of an industrial econ-
omy. More intrusive means of organizing the economy came into vogue;
socialism and communism gained many adherents. FDR's response was
government regulation, the rise of the welfare state and-of most rele-
vance for our purposes-the National Industrial Recovery Act, NRA
Codes and the resulting government sponsorship of industry cartels
throughout the economy. Cartels were plainly to be preferred over "free"
competition and the chaos it brought.
One new form of competition that emerged in those Depression
years was discounting through newly-emerging giant mass merchandis-
ers. These vast chains leaned on manufacturers for far better prices than
mom-and-pop stores paid for their goods, and the chains passed the bene-
fit onto their customers. While their lower prices were a boon to con-
sumers, they were a threat to the survival of mom-and-pops. Huey Long
sought to champion the cause of mom-and-pops everywhere with his
declaration that he "would rather have thieves and gangsters than chain
stores in Louisiana."' 8 In this spirit, Congress passed and FDR signed the
1936 Robinson-Patman Act that broadened prohibitions on "price dis-
crimination" and actually encouraged cartel pricing in many industries.
The discounting that threatened those mom-and-pops had been en-
couraged by a 1911 antitrust ruling of the Supreme Court that declared it
illegal for manufacturers to prevent their resellers from discounting be-
low manufacturer-suggested resale prices, the practice then known and
still known today as "resale price maintenance." 9 Mom-and-pops
wanted that price maintenance to be restored. Congress obliged in 1937
with its passage of the "Miller-Tydings Act" that authorized states to
7 The Federal Trade Commission Act is now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et. seq. The
Clayton Act is now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18 et. seq.
8 Quoted in THEODORE N. BECKMAN & HERMAN C. NOLAN, THE CHAIN
STORE PROBLEM 336-337 (1938).
9 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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enact "Fair Trade Laws" allowing manufacturers to impose and enforce
price maintenance agreements on their resellers. A majority of states
accepted this invitation, thereby again promoting cartel pricing.
III. RENEWED COMMEIMENT
By the end of the 1930s, FDR and his advisors had soured on cartel
solutions. FDR appointed Thurman Arnold as Chief of the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Justice Department. The budget and staff of the Antitrust
Division were quadrupled in the first three years of Arnold's reign, and
he declared war on cartels and monopolies across the economy. He fo-
cused in large part on attacking what came to be described as "naked"
agreements among leading competitors to fix prices and divide markets.
His prosecutions of these kinds of cases provided opportunities for the
Supreme Court to strengthen and extend prior holdings that agreements
of this sort were illegal per se. 10
Arnold won a major monopolization suit against Alcoa with an
opinion by Judge Learned Hand that resonates with provocative albeit
contradictory ramifications for antitrust policy to this day. Judge Hand
observed that "the successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
must not be turned upon when he wins."" Yet he held that Alcoa had
unlawfully acquired monopoly power over the aluminum industry be-
cause it constantly expanded production capacity over 20 years to meet
every expected increase in demand before others had a chance to enter; it
thereby "forestalled all competition and succeeded in holding.the field
alone."12
Arnold's reign coincided with a period during which the entire in-
dustrial base of the country mobilized in support of a new World War
against the forces of international fascism. It also coincided with a rising
tide of industrial concentration sparked by a new wave of merger activity
that once again alarmed a great many people. The Federal Trade Com-
mission published a report in 1948 that documented the trend and high-
lighted the dangers to the economy in this "unchecked" corporate
consolidation. 13 Congress responded with its enactment of the Celler-
Kefauver Act of 1950 that closed major loopholes in the coverage of
mergers under the 1914 Clayton Act-extending its reach to "asset" as
well as stock acquisitions, covering vertical as well as horizontal merg-
ers, establishing that the law could stop mergers even when they
10 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813 (1946).
11 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
12 Id.
13 FTC, THE PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISI-
TIONS (1948).
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presented only an "incipient" rather than an actual concentration threat,
and inaugurating a period of aggressive anti-merger enforcement activity
over the course of the next two decades. 14
The Eisenhower Administration embraced not only the mandate of
the Celler-Kefauver Act but the thrust of the Thurman Arnold antitrust
enforcement program generally. It was during the Eisenhower years that
the Antitrust Division initiated a spectacular series of criminal price-fix-
ing conspiracy cases against General Electric Company, Westinghouse
Corporation, and a number of smaller electrical equipment manufactur-
ers. Several high-level executives were actually sent off to prison; the
private plaintiffs' antitrust bar followed up with an unprecedented burst
of actions for treble damages on behalf of all electric utilities and other
equipment buyers. Lots of people in high positions then got the message
that antitrust compliance was a matter of critical importance. Surveying
the landscape in the mid-1960s, Richard Hofstadler captured the essence
of how antitrust enforcement was affecting the business community gen-
erally by that time: 'Today, anybody who knows anything about the con-
duct of American business knows that the managers of the large
corporations do their business with one eye constantly cast over their
shoulders at the Antitrust Division."15
IV. THE 1960s
The "Populist School" of antitrust thinking dominated develop-
ments in antitrust law throughout the 1960s. The Warren Supreme Court
interpreted the Celler-Kefauver Act as establishing a presumption of ille-
gality for mergers in already concentrated industries between competitors
with a combined market share as low as 30% and, in some cases, con-
demning mergers involving combined market shares that were well be-
low 10%.16 Challenges to mergers as well as joint ventures between
firms that were only "potential" competitors of each other were also up-
held.' 7 Vertical mergers between manufacturers and downstream distrib-
utors were treated almost as harshly. 18 At the high tide of this run,
dissenting Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart complained that "[t]he
14 See Dereck C. Bok, Section Seven of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960).
15 RICHARD HOFSTADLER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 192-93 (1965).
16 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963); United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,(1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546,
272 (1966).
17 United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967).
18 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-334 (1962).
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sole consistency" he could find in the Court's merger cases was that "the
Government always wins."19
Vertical arrangements under which a manufacturer assigned exclu-
sive territories or allocated customers among its distributors were con-
demned under Section 1 of the Sherman Act as illegal per se.20 Vertical
"tying" arrangements also became easy targets of attack under Section
1.21 As already mentioned, a manufacturer's prescription of "minimum"
resale prices that prevented resellers from reducing consumer prices be-
low suggested levels had been deemed illegal per se since 1911 (except
when allowed by the Miller-Tydings Act). The Warren Court extended
that prohibition to manufacturer prescriptions of "maximum" resale
prices, thereby ensuring resellers' freedom to raise consumer prices
above suggested levels.22 The Warren Court's rulings under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act and under the Robinson-Patman Act exposed market
leaders in many industries to antitrust liability under exceptionally vague
notions of "exclusionary" conduct and of "predatory" pricing defined to
encompass even prices above the market leader's costs but low enough
to make life difficult for its smaller, less efficient rivals. 23
Most of those cases came to the Supreme Court on appeals from
dismissals of the antitrust claims at issue by lower court judges schooled
in a more conservative environment and slow to embrace populist think-
ing. Their resistance to the directions in which the Supreme Court was
pushing antitrust policy was supported by a cadre of prominent scholars,
some of whom were openly hostile to the whole idea of an antitrust law
regime.24 While they were little more than a fringe element of the aca-
demic community during this period, we will shortly see how they came
to dominate the antitrust landscape a generation later.
19 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966).
20 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
21 See Former Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99
(1969).
22 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968).
23 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966); Utah Pie Co. v. Conti-
nental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 697-98 (1967).
24 Among their ranks was a relatively young firebrand by the name of Alan Greenspan,
the man later destined to lead the Federal Reserve and in that role to wield as much influence
over the economy of the 1990s as J.P. Morgan wielded in the absence of a Federal Reserve in
the 1910s. Before even the first of the Warren Court's expansive interpretations of antitrust
law, he was calling for repeal of the Sherman Act in its entirety: 'The Sherman Act may be
understandable when viewed as a projection of the nineteenth century's fear and economic
ignorance. But it is utter nonsense in the context of today's economic knowledge. ... The
entire structure of antitrust statutes in this country is a jumble of economic irrationality and
ignorance. It is a product: (a) of a gross misinterpretation of history, and (b) of rather naive,
and certainly unrealistic, economic theories." A. Greenspan, Paper delivered at the Antitrust
Seminar of the National Association of Business Economists in 1961 and published by the
Nathaniel Brandon Institute in 1962.
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On the last day of the Johnson Administration in 1969, the Justice
Department filed a massive Section 2 monopolization suit against IBM
that the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations would then pour endless
resources into litigating throughout the 1970s. It was in many respects
the Antitrust Division's Vietnam War, and it became a lightning rod for
growing opposition to populist-oriented antitrust policy.
V. THE 1970s
Aggressive antitrust enforcement activity, however, continued
apace. With virtually all significant horizontal and vertical merger trans-
actions blocked by controlling Warren Court precedents, corporate em-
pire-building moved in the direction of "conglomerate" combinations of
firms in seemingly unrelated businesses and industries. The Nixon Ad-
ministration's Justice Department mounted a series of celebrated cases
based on novel theories of how a conglomerate merger could threaten
competition even without any increased concentration or vertical foreclo-
sure within any specific affected market. The Federal Trade Commission
in this same period developed the theory of unlawful "shared" monopoly
and applied it in huge cases-under Section 5 of the FTC Act-against
the leading firms in the petroleum and cereal industries. The Ford Ad-
ministration filed a monopolization suit against AT&T that rivaled the
IBM suit in scope and notoriety. The Carter Administration's Justice
Department sought to extend the FTC's shared monopoly concept and
mounted highly publicized investigations into dozens of industries in
search of a Section 2 shared monopoly case.
The antitrust story of the 1970s includes a considerable amount of
new legislation, mostly sponsored by the Ford Administration. Thus,
Congress (a) sharply raised the penalties for criminal violations by, for
example, raising the maximum prison sentence for convicted individuals
from one to three years per violation; (b) repealed the 1937 Miller-Tyd-
ings Act, thereby again exposing manufacturers' resale price mainte-
nance practices to full-scale attack regardless of state law; (c) authorized
state attorney-generals to file federal antitrust suits for both treble dam-
ages and injunctive relief as "parens patriae" on behalf of all citizens
within their states, and appropriated substantial sums of money to subsi-
dize the building of antitrust enforcement staffs within every state across
the country; and (d) created a new scheme of pre-merger notification and
waiting-period requirements enabling the antitrust agencies to investigate
every significant merger transaction prior to consummation. This last
development, enacted as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, effected a sea-change in merger enforcement activity, away
from litigation seeking "divestiture" relief years after a merger had been
completed and toward much more of a "regulatory" regime of advance
SHIF'ING SANDS OF ANTUST POLICY
review and negotiation over competitive concerns before a merger is al-
lowed to proceed.
Serious attention during that same period was also given to two
quite radical legislative proposals. One would have restructured the en-
tire petroleum industry through massive divestitures that would com-
pletely eliminate vertical integration (from exploration through refining
and marketing) and prohibit any future reintegration. The other would
enact a "no-fault" standard for unlawful monopolization, enabling the
enforcement agencies to seek dissolution of any firm found to possess
monopoly power without regard to whether it obtained that power
through predation or efficiency. These proposals received considerable
support from some quarters of the business community as well as from
the enforcement agencies and academia, albeit not enough to bring them
to fruition.
But at the same time that Congress as well as both enforcement
agencies were pushing into these new frontiers, the Burger Supreme
Court with Nixon appointees was pushing its antitrust jurisprudence in an
opposite direction-one at odds with the populist thrust of the 1960s
Warren Court precedents. The Court importantly qualified past rulings
on horizontal mergers by cautioning that findings of high market shares
and concentration were only the beginning of a required deeper inquiry
into whether a merger presented serious risk to future competition gener-
ally.25 The Court also imposed high barriers to any merger challenge
based on the theory that the merger would eliminate "potential" competi-
tion between the merging parties.26 Thus, notwithstanding Justice Stew-
art's complaint of a half decade earlier, the 1970s found the Government
consistently losing merger cases at the end of appeals processes.
In 1977, the Supreme Court expressly overruled its own decision of
1967 that declared all vertical territorial and customer restraints on resel-
lers illegal per se, now holding that arrangements of this sort could be
"efficient" and justified by a showing that their elimination of "in-
trabrand" competition was outweighed by their enhancement of "inter-
brand" competition. 27 That same year, the Court put brakes on the
proliferation of private antitrust litigation by establishing new criteria for
the "antitrust standing" of a would-be plaintiff and barring altogether "in-
direct" purchasers from any opportunity to sue for damages. 28 In 1979
the Court allowed a form of horizontal price-fixing to escape per se con-
25 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1974).
26 See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 641-42 (1974).
27 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977).
28 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1977); Illi-
nois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977).
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demnation by a showing that it was a necessary part of an otherwise
lawful collaboration with significant efficiency-enhancing potential.29
In short, while the "Populist School" of antitrust thinking was in
ascendancy at both the Supreme Court and the enforcement agencies
throughout the 1960s, and remained very much alive at the agencies
throughout the 1970s, something quite different was taking hold at the
Supreme Court as the 1970s unfolded. That something was the rise in
the influence of the avowedly anti-populist "Chicago School" of antitrust
thinking. This school evolved from the work of an army of antitrust
critics populating both the law schools and economics departments of
prominent universities across the country. The University of Chicago
was the center of this effort and thereby gave the movement its name.30
By the mid-1970s, Robert Bork became its most prominent spokesman
and he captured the essence of Chicago School philosophy in a broadly
influential 1978 book entitled The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War
with Itself. An understanding of the thrust of this philosophy is critical to
an appreciation of what has happened to antitrust policy from the end of
the 1970s to our day.
The core of this philosophy is that the sole legitimate objective of
antitrust law should be maximization of "consumer welfare." Under this
view, antitrust policy lost its way under the influence of populist con-
cerns with "small business" welfare and negative attitudes toward both
single-firm bigness and industrywide concentration generally. Chicago
School advocates denied the legitimacy of any political or social policy
purposes behind antitrust law; consumer welfare demanded an exclusive
focus on "economic efficiency" throughout the economy. Professor
Bork and his Chicago School brethren accepted the validity of tough
rules against naked cartels that raised consumer prices without off-setting
efficiency benefits. On the other hand, they opposed any and all antitrust
strictures on "vertical" arrangements that impeded the freedom of manu-
facturers to distribute their products as they saw fit; opposed vague no-
tions of "predatory" conduct that became tools for attacking efficient
monopolies; and opposed any attack on mergers other than those that
would leave a market with fewer than three rivals since all other mergers
were likely to be more efficiency-enhancing than competition-
threatening.
29 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979).
30 It may or may not be more than a coincidence that the University of Chicago owes its
founding to the philanthropy of John D. Rockefeller, and he played an active role in selection
of its faculty as well as curriculum in its early years. See CHERNOW, supra note 2, at 301-
29, 492-97.
SHI=rTG SANDs OF ANTITRUST POLICY
While Chicago School adherents trumpeted their support of "con-
sumer welfare," they used that term in a counterintuitive manner to mean
overall economy-wide efficiency rather than the protection of consumers
as a class distinct from producers or a producer's shareholding owners.
Under their view, a practice or transaction may well result in higher con-
sumer prices as a result of reduced competition and thus some degree of
monopoly power, but that was only the start of the analysis and not a
sufficient basis to invoke antitrust condemnation. The higher prices
would reduce demand for and thus output of the particular product in-
volved, and that would result in what economists call reduced "consumer
surplus" and "deadweight loss." On the other hand, the same practice or
transaction may reduce producer costs and increase producer profits, and
that would result in what economists call increased "producer surplus"
that could then induce an "efficient" reallocation of productive resources
into some other market. As long as the increase in producer surplus out-
weighed both the decrease in consumer surplus and the deadweight loss,
the net result was increased overall economic output and thus increased
"allocative" efficiency. On that ground, the practice or transaction
should be lawful under the antitrust laws. The mere fact that there was a
wealth redistribution from consumers to producers (or their shareholders)
should be irrelevant to the antitrust equation.31
It is hard to imagine that anyone who attended and was half-awake
during Professor Huff's American History classes would buy that line.
The idea that antitrust is about "allocative efficiency" and has nothing to
do with political, social or wealth redistribution concerns does not square
with what we know to have been the historical roots of antitrust policy. 32
Nonetheless, as the 1970s came to a close, the country as a whole was
more into economics than history. Inflation and unemployment were at
record highs, productivity was going nowhere, and the whole economy
was in bad shape. People were attracted to Ronald Reagan's call to "get
the government off the backs of business," and that call included ideas
about a sharply reduced role for antitrust enforcement. The Chicago
31 See Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoff, 58
AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
32 See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1051 (1979) ("It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in
interpreting the antitrust laws. By 'political values,' I mean, first, a fear that excessive concen-
tration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and second, a desire
to enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range within which private discre-
tion by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of all. A third and overriding
political concern is that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under
antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy
so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a
more intrusive role in economic affairs.").
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School provided the overall theory as well as specific prescriptions for
this reorientation.
VI. THE 1980s
The Reagan Administration installed true believers in Chicago
School thinking at both enforcement agencies and also appointed Chi-
cago School scholars to the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
The result was a major shift of antitrust policy in several respects, albeit
not in an entirely one-sided direction. Reagan appointed William Baxter
as his first Chief of the Antitrust Division, and his first priority was an
in-depth reexamination of the two long running monopolization cases
that he inherited from his predecessors. He announced his decision on
how to dispose of both cases on the same day in 1982: (a) the IBM
challenge was to be abandoned altogether as completely without merit;
and (b) the AT&T case was to be settled with the largest breakup in
antitrust history. The separation of the Ma-Bell empire into seven in-
dependent local exchange carriers and a "new" AT&T focused on long-
distance telephone service and equipment manufacturing came to be seen
as an act of courage that Baxter's successors heartily applauded even
while sharply criticizing his policy directions in other respects. 33
Also in 1982, the Baxter regime promulgated new "Merger Guide-
lines" that transformed merger policy into an exclusively "economic
analysis" discipline. At the same time, however, his approach to merger
economics fell short of that urged by Chicago School purists. The new
Guidelines declared the fundamental purpose of merger policy to be the
prevention of any merger that created, increased or facilitated the exer-
cise of "market power," defined as either the unilateral or collective abil-
ity to raise prices above "competitive" levels. In short, if a merger
threatened to result in higher prices to the consumer, it was presumed to
be illegal-subject to fairly narrow exceptions. On the other hand, under
these new Guidelines, lots of mergers between leading competitors that
seriously increased market concentration would escape challenge if re-
mamning competition or low barriers to new entry could be expected to
discipline pricing and prevent a price increase. In practice, this new par-
adigm resulted in an exceptionally permissive merger policy throughout
the 1980s: a great many major mergers were found safe from any risk of
creating, increasing or facilitating the exercise of market power despite
33 See Louis Galambos, When Antitrust Helped, and Why it Doesn't Now, THE WASH-
INGTON POST, June 13, 1999, at B-5 ("Everyone involved knew from the start that this was
a historic occasion, maybe even a defining moment in U.S. political economy. A Republican
administration - Reagan's - was breaking up a monopoly, in this case the largest private corpo-
ration in the world. Ma Bell was such a fixture in American life that her passing at first
elicited a shock, and then a flood of sentimentality.").
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their size and market share dimensions, often because the agency was
quick to accept arguments about low entry barriers and thus ease of entry
into the markets in question. Enforcement activity against vertical or any
other non-horizontal mergers was non-existent in this period.
Baxter had been a long-time critic of all antitrust strictures upon
vertical restraints, including the law against resale price maintenance.
His predecessor in the Carter Administration had gone so far as to file a
criminal prosecution against one manufacturer's resale price mainte-
nance policy.34 Moving to the opposite extreme, he entered a private
treble-damage case before the Supreme Court to urge abandonment of
the per se rule against this practice. In the aftermath of the Court's reaf-
firmation of that per se rule in that case,35 the Reagan Administration
(under Baxter's successor) promulgated a set of "Vertical Restraint
Guidelines" with the purpose and effect of virtually foreclosing any fed-
eral enforcement activity against vertical restraints of any kind, including
resale price maintenance restraints.
By this time, however, a counter-revolution was well underway at
the state enforcement level. The seed money for state antitrust enforce-
ment provided by the Ford Administration in the mid-1970s had borne
fruit and antitrust staffs of state attorneys-general organized into a formi-
dable new army of populist warriors under the umbrella of the National
Association of Attorneys-General-known as "NAAG". In direct defi-
ance of the new bent at the federal level, the state antitrusters promul-
gated their own aggressive NAAG Merger Guidelines and NAAG
Vertical Restraint Guidelines. They began challenging mergers ap-
proved by the federal agencies and mounting nationwide parens patraie
suits against manufacturers engaged in various forms of vertical price
maintenance. The Reagan Administration was mortified by this new
strain of activist federalism and this rebirth of "states rights. '36
Just as the Populists in the 1970s lobbied Congress to expand the
scope of antitrust law, the Reaganites in the 1980s mounted legislative
initiatives of their own but in the opposite direction. The Administration
sponsored but failed to elicit much Congressional interest in amendments
to the Clayton Act that would have created an "efficiencies" defense to
34 See United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,979 (D. Conn.
1981).
35 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Services Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984).
36 See Albert A. Foer, The Federal Antitrust Commitment: Providing Resources to Meet
the Challenge at 9 n.12 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Journal of
Law and Public Policy) (arguing that far from being new to this period, state antitrust enforce-
ment activity had roots deeper than federal antitrust enforcement activity) ("At least 26 states
had adopted constitutional or statutory antimonopoly statutes prior to the Sherman Act. In the
1970s over 20 states enacted new antitrust statutes and many state antitrust enforcement offices
were created or expanded.").
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an otherwise unlawful merger and would have required more considera-
tion of foreign competition and "international competitiveness" concerns
in the evaluation of a merger's legality. On the other hand, the Adminis-
tration sponsored and won Congressional approval of legislation reduc-
ing antitrust exposure for competitor collaborations aimed at promoting
export trade and for R&D joint ventures. Finally, Congress on its own
initiative slapped Mr. Baxter's wrists by prohibiting any use of appropri-
ated funds for the Antitrust Division to advocate reform of the existing
per se prohibition on resale price maintenance.
The federal agencies during those Reagan years devoted considera-
ble resources to the pursuit of naked cartels. Their targets, however,
tended to be rather small-scale: the Antitrust Division concentrated upon
conspiracies among local cement producers, milk distributors and whole-
sale bakeries; the FTC concentrated upon competition-restraining codes
of conduct promulgated by associations of small businesses and profes-
sionals. Perhaps it would have been more rational for state antitrusters to
pursue those cases, but state antitrusters were too busy attacking mergers
and practices of nationwide scope that the Feds chose to ignore. (It was
particularly ironic that the FTC in these years devoted so much of its
resources to a reign of terror upon association restraints. Wilson and
Brandeis envisioned this agency as one that would encourage association
activities among small businesses struggling to survive against industrial
titans at their throats.)
Meantime, at the Supreme Court, antitrust law development was a
mixed bag from the standpoint of the Chicago School. On the one hand,
the Court markedly toughened evidentiary requirements for inferring
concerted action among independent firms, thereby making it tougher for
either government enforcers or private plaintiffs to win suits alleging
either horizontal collusion or vertical restraints of trade under Section 1
of the Sherman Act.37 On the other hand, as already mentioned, the
Court reaffirmed the per se rule against resale price maintenance and also
reaffirmed the per se rule against vertical "tying" arrangements (albeit
with a sharpened requirement for proof of market power before per se
illegality would apply).38 The Chicago School was particularly critical of
a 1985 ruling39 in which the Supreme Court upheld a jury finding of
unlawful maintenance of monopoly power based on a dominant com-
pany's refusal to assist and cooperate with its smaller rival, a ruling that
reenergized monopolization suits by the private plaintiffs' bar under Sec-
37 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1986); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988).
38 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Services Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760 (1984); Jefferson Par-
ish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-13(1984).
39 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985).
SHIFTING SANDs OF ANTITRUST POLICY
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. A 1986 ruling sharply curtailed competitors'
standing to challenge mergers between their direct rivals; 40 on the other
hand, a 1990 ruling squarely upheld state attorney-general standing to
obtain divestiture relief against a consummated merger that one of the
federal agencies previously approved.41 Two rulings during the 1980s
condemned nontraditional horizontal arrangements that, while not en-
tirely "naked" restraints like price-fixing or market division, were held to
be sufficiently anticompetitive on their face to be illegal under a sharply
abbreviated version of the rule of reason.42 These latter rulings provided
ammunition for much of the FTC's program of attacking trade associa-
tion restraints of all kinds during this same period.
As the 1980s came to a close, thoughtful observers from many
quarters of the political landscape came to believe that antitrust permis-
siveness and indeed the more general "deregulation" of big business had
gone too far. The nation suffered through a stock market crash, the S&L
debacle and other disasters with their roots in anything-goes cowboy cap-
italism. By the time of George Bush's inauguration, there was a consen-
sus even among most segments of the Republican Party that the country
again needed serious antitrust cops on the beat. President Bush ap-
pointed enforcers who were believers in mainstream antitrust policy-
neither excessively intrusive Populists as in the 1960s nor excessively
permissive Chicagoists as in the 1980s. James Rill, the new Chief of the
Antitrust Division, and Janet Steiger, the new Chair of the FTC, began a
revival of federal antitrust enforcement policy that won a broad degree of
bipartisan support.
VII. THE 1990s
One of Rill's and Steiger's first priorities was to end the war be-
tween federal and state antitrust enforcers and to sponsor a "new federal-
ism" of cooperative activity. As the Feds became more enforcement-
minded and the State AGs became less populist in their orientation, they
found common ground and moved in the direction of joint Federal-State
enforcement investigations. One major focus of this cooperation was
merger policy, an area where conflicting standards were particularly
anathema to the business community. The Bush agencies promulgated
revised Merger Guidelines that retained the essence of the Baxter Guide-
lines with their focus on "market power" analysis but that markedly
toughened the requirements for an "ease of entry" defense to a horizontal
merger between major rivals in a concentrated industry. The State AGs
40 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986).
41 California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
42 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); FTC v. Indiana Federation of Den-
tists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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revised State Merger Guidelines to bring them closer to federal stan-
dards. Merger enforcement increased at both levels, and there were no
more mergers approved by the federal authorities that were then chal-
lenged by state authorities.
Another top priority of the Bush agencies was to "internationalize"
antitrust enforcement. There were several dimensions to this initiative.
First, international trade was expanding at a rapid pace and our domestic
markets were being transformed into global markets. In this environ-
ment, collusive and other anticompetitive conduct among European and
Asian firms-undertaken within their own countries but affecting how
they did business within the United States-was seen as detrimental to
the interests of U.S. consumers, and these firms became major targets of
Bush antitrust enforcement activity. Second, European and Asian firms
were also seen as engaging in actions aimed at protecting their own mar-
kets from U.S. exports to the detriment of the U.S. business community.
The Bush Administration asserted the right to employ the U.S. antitrust
laws against foreign conduct undercutting the ability of U.S. businesses
to compete abroad even in the absence of any impact on U.S. consumers.
This new focus on both foreign conduct that restrained imports and thus
adversely affected U.S. consumers and foreign conduct that adversely
restrained exports and thus adversely affect U.S. businesses pushed the
frontiers of the "extraterritorial" application of U.S. antitrust law. Some
of our largest trading partners abroad saw this as improper conflation of
antitrust and trade policy or a new form of "antitrust imperialism," but it
was applauded by many voices within the U.S. business community.
A third major dimension of this "foreign policy" was international
antitrust enforcement cooperation along with aggressive assistance in the
growth of foreign antitrust enforcement regimes. Of course, our promo-
tion of antitrust policy abroad was not an entirely new idea. Fifty years
earlier, we recognized that unrestrained concentrations of industrial
power had fueled the forces of totalitarianism on two continents. In the
immediate aftermath of World War II, in our role as overseer of the de-
feated Axis powers, we insisted that both Germany and Japan enact anti-
trust laws as among the core infrastructures of new free, democratic
societies. Similar thinking inspired the Bush Administration, in the im-
mediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist
regimes throughout Eastern and Central Europe at the beginning of the
1990s, to promote the adoption of antitrust laws in all of the newly
emerging states in that region. A steady stream of both lawyers and
economists from the Bush agencies journeyed to those emerging states to
assist in drafting antitrust legislation and training the people within those
countries who would be responsible for enforcement activity. Russian,
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Polish, Czech, Hungarian and other new European antitrusters traveled to
the United States to see first-hand U.S. antitrust enforcement in action.
Antitrust policy had been a significant feature of the European Eco-
nomic Community since its creation in the 1950s, and its antitrust en-
forcement apparatus had developed by the early 1990s to a point where it
had become a matter of importance to U.S. companies doing business in
Europe. The Bush Administration's antitrust agencies found themselves
increasingly concerned with international mergers and collusive arrange-
ments that were also of concern to the E.C.'s competition authority. In
1991 the Antitrust Division, the FTC and the E.C.'s competition author-
ity jointly announced their execution of a U.S.-E.C. Antitrust Enforce-
ment Cooperation Agreement, inaugurating a liaison that became a
significant feature of antitrust enforcement activity on both continents
over the course of this decade.
While the Bush appointees did reinvigorate antitrust enforcement,43
they did not stray far from the Chicago School orientation of the Reagan
years. By the time of President Clinton's first inauguration in 1993,
however, the Chicago School was losing its lustre and becoming up-
staged in Washington salons by what came to be called the "post-Chi-
cago School." This post-Chicago economics crowd accepted the
Chicago School's "consumer welfare" standard but redefined it to mean
preservation of competition for the unambiguous benefit of consumers
rather than unfettered freedom of producers to undertake whatever might
be rationalized in the name of maximizing allocative efficiency. They
brought insights from business management and "game theory" scholars
about certain kinds of "strategic" conduct that could enable dominant
firms in concentrated industries to raise entry barriers and raise rivals'
costs in ways that this school considered appropriate targets of antitrust
enforcement. 44 Among the adherents of post-Chicago thinking of this
sort were Clinton's appointees to the enforcement agencies and courts.
43 Many members of the academic community were shocked to find the Bush Adminis-
tration extending antitrust enforcement into academia itself by challenging "collusion" among
universities in the allocation of student financial aid. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d
658 (3d Cir. 1993). If it is any solace, many members of the legal profession were shocked to
discover in the mid-1970s that the antitrust laws apply to their profession and thereby prohibit
collectively devised minimum fee schedules, see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975); and law school professors were shocked to discover four years ago that the antitrust
laws prohibit their collective determination of minimum faculty salaries, see United States v.
American Bar Association, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996).
44 See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges
and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63 Antitrust L.J. 669
(1995): "Post-Chicago antitrust economics is a world of the imagination, an intellectual neigh-
borhood where a number of economists, lawyers, judges, and enforcement officials are to be
found these days. It is a neighborhood in transition, not a well-planned, fully wrought new
town. It defines itself largely by the ways it differs from the antitrust thinking associated
with... Chicago theory... The difference between Chicago and post-Chicago thinking about
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Thus, Anne Bingaman, Clinton's first Chief of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, began her reign by announcing the rescission of the Reagan re-
gime's excessively permissive Vertical Restraint Guidelines and her
determination to reinstate serious enforcement against anticompetitive
vertical arrangements generally and resale price maintenance practices in
particular. She took on Microsoft in the first new government monopoli-
zation challenge since the 1970s. Her successor, Joel Klein, brought a
more far-reaching monopolization case against the same target, the
Microsoft case discussed later in this paper. The Antitrust Division
under both Bingaman and Klein sharply increased criminal enforcement
against price-fixing conspiracies of international scope, extracting huge
fines from their corporate targets and serious prison sentences for respon-
sible individuals.45 Merger enforcement activity escalated as well, with
vertical as well as horizontal mergers becoming targets again for the first
time since the 1970s.
Clinton's appointment as the new Chairman of the FTC was Robert
Pitofsky, a widely respected antitrust scholar who had been a sharp critic
of the Chicago School and of lax enforcement policy throughout the
1980s. His first priority was a broad-ranging reassessment of antitrust
policy in light of how both globalization trends and high-technology de-
velopments were transforming the nature of competition throughout our
markets. Following three months of public hearings that obtained input
from all quarters of the antitrust community as well as from many promi-
nent business executives, the agency published an in-depth report on
"Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-
competition and monopoly is related to the difference often noted between neoclassical and
industrial organization (10) economics. Both recognize the efficiency of competition and the
allocative costs of monopoly. Chicago analysts ... tend both to start and stop with deductive
analysis based on a sequence of truisms expressed through highly abstracted models of reality.
Post-Chicago antitrust starts from essentially the same position but, in the 10 tradition, digs
into empirical material in an effort to fathom the significance of observed distinctions between
classic models and the configuration of the particular market under examination." See also
Joseph F. Brodley, Post-Chicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy, 63 Antitrust L.J. 683
(1995).
45 One of Ms. Bingaman's first acts as Antitrust Chief was promulgation of a sharply
expanded "amnesty" program for companies self-reporting their participation in price-fixing
conspiracies and other criminal violations of the antitrust laws before the Division uncovers
the conduct on its own. The program is credited with having brought a twenty-fold increase in
the number of informers showing up at the Antitrust Division and having become a "most
effective generator of large cases" over the course of the past six years. Gary R. Spratling,
"Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse," Presentation to D.C. Bar Symposium
on Associations and Antitrust, Feb. 16, 1999; Gary R. Spratling, "Negotiating the Waters of
International Cartel Prosecutions," Presentation to National Institute on White Collar Crime,
March 4, 1999. See also Janet Novack, FORBES, May 4, 1998, at 46: "If someone in your
company has been conspiring with competitors to fix prices, here's some sound advice. Get to
the Justice Department before your co-conspirators do. Confess and the U.S. Department of
Justice will let you off the hook. But hurry! Only one conspirator per cartel."
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Tech, Global Marketplace." It was a masterful brief in support of the
continued and indeed heightened importance of antitrust policy to our
new economy. It also identified new issues confronting antitrust policy
in this new environment, issues at the heart of much of the enforcement
activity at both the FTC and the Antitrust Division over the course of the
past few years.
One such issue has been how to deal with the rapid pace of innova-
tion and its critical role in global high-technology and information mar-
kets. Whereas, in the past, the main focus of antitrust attention was
"price" competition and preventing either conduct or mergers that could
result in higher prices, the far more important focus today is innovation
competition and preventing either conduct or mergers that could result in
less innovation. The Clinton antitrusters have been sensitive to the fact
that in many parts of the high-technology sector collaborations or merg-
ers between major competitors may well enhance innovation prospects.
The challenge has been to distinguish between those more likely to en-
hance competition and those more likely to retard competition in this
innovation dimension. The Clinton agencies have repeatedly confronted
mergers between rivals in pharmaceutical, computer, defense and other
high-technology sectors that are seen as threatening to reduce innovation
in some areas while at the same time creating the potential to accelerate
innovation in other areas. Rather than seeking either to stop or allow
these kinds of mergers altogether, the agencies have fashioned "surgical"
remedies that condition clearance upon such arrangements as technology
licensing to third parties and that thereby preserve the potential for inno-
vation enhancement in some respects while eliminating the risk of ad-
verse innovation effects in other respects. 46
Another closely related issue has been how to deal with the growing
centrality of intellectual as opposed to physical property as assets that
determine which firms thrive and which firms struggle or fail to survive
in the new markets that dominate the economy. For Standard Oil a hun-
dred years ago, the key to dominance was control of petroleum transpor-
tation, refining and distribution facilities. For Microsoft today, the key to
dominance is control over the source code to its operating system and
application programming interfaces to it. Again, the Clinton antitrusters
have been sensitive to the concern that enforcement activity should not
dilute incentives to invest in high-risk and hugely expensive intellectual
property development efforts to the disadvantage of society as a whole.
46 See generally C. Robinson, "Leap-Frog and Other Forms of Innovation: Protecting the
Future for High-Tech and Emerging Industries Through Merger Enforcement," Address
Before the American Bar Association, June 10, 1999; Richard J. Gilbert and Steven
C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of
Innovation Markets, 65 Antitrust L.J 569 (1995).
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At the same time, they recognize the reality that intellectual property
control over new core technologies can result in enduring monopoly
power over multiple complementary or adjacent markets. The challenge
has been to distinguish between legitimate enjoyment of the fruits of in-
vestment in intellectual property development and predatory abuses of
intellectual property control to foreclose access and entry opportunities
of would-be rivals.47
The rapidly changing health care sector has been a major antitrust
battleground throughout the Clinton years. The increasing clout of man-
aged care enterprises and the cost-containment pressures they bring have
caused physicians, hospitals and other health care providers throughout
the country to respond in many ways that have run afoul of the antitrust
laws. Physicians in particular have combined forces to protect their in-
terests (and purportedly the interests of their patients) against what they
see as abusive controls by health care payors; the antitrust authorities
have seen these efforts as naked cartels to maintain fees. The Clintonites
have been sensitive to the need to clarify and adjust the application of
antitrust strictures to unique aspects of health care markets and thereby
facilitate the evolution of more efficient means of providing health care
services. At the same time, however, they have drawn the line against
provider practices that restrain competition without off-setting efficiency
justifications. 4
Not satisfied with where those lines have been drawn, the American
Medical Association has now turned to Congress for an antitrust exemp-
tion that would allow physicians and other health care providers to en-
gage in "collective bargaining" with health care payors. As of this
writing, there appears to be growing support for this initiative, particu-
larly throughout the House of Representatives. Both Mr. Pitofsky and
Mr. Klein have testified in opposition; they have forcefully defended
their agencies' actions in this area and eloquently presented the case for
continued antitrust oversight of the health care sector generally in the
years ahead.49
While the Clinton antitrusters have been hard at work refining and
updating antitrust policy for its third century, the Supreme Court has con-
tinued to march to its own unique drummer in its evolution of antitrust
jurisprudence. Over the course of the 1990s, it (a) opened the floodgates
to a whole new world of antitrust litigation against efforts by high-tech-
47 See T. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine, The Anti-
trust Bulletin 211 (Spring 1999); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMissION,
ANnrrRusr GuirFu4Es FOR Trm LICENsmNG OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995).
48 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMSSION, STATEMENTS OF AN-
TrrRusT ENFORCEMENT POLICY iN HEALTH CARE (1996).
49 Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1304 Before the House
Connittee on the Judiciary, June 22, 1999.
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nology equipment manufacturers to suppress competition for after-sale
service of their equipment by small independent service providers; 50 (b)
endorsed an exceptionally expansive application of the extraterritorial ju-
risdiction of the antitrust laws over foreign conduct aimed at restraining
U.S. commerce; 51 (c) confirmed that per se illegality remains the rule
applicable to efforts among professionals to increase fees for their serv-
ices and market divisions among otherwise competing service provid-
ers;52 and (d) narrowed the exemption from antitrust liability for
anticompetitive conduct approved by state governments.5 3
On the other hand, the Supreme Court also in this same period
(a) sharply constricted the circumstances in which dominant firms can be
found liable for unlawful "predatory pricing" against smaller rivals;54
(b) tightened the requirements for any kind of "attempted" monopoliza-
tion claim; 55 (c) repudiated its own 30-year-old precedent against manu-
facturers' efforts to impose "maximum" resale prices on their resellers,
holding such practices to be entitled to more permissive rule of reason
treatment;56 (d) narrowed the circumstances in which vertical refusals to
deal could be successfully challenged as antitrust offenses; 57 and
(e) narrowed the circumstances in which horizontal restraints of various
kinds could be condemned without detailed market analysis.5 8
These rulings reflect divergent inclinations among the current mem-
bers of the Supreme Court, some of whom remain die-hard adherents of
the Chicago School and others of whom are more receptive to insights
offered by the post-Chicago School. The Court as a whole, however,
remains supportive of the fundamental premises that have driven anti-
trust policy for 110 years.
VIII. THE FUTURE
At this dawn of the 21St Century, antitrust policy has once again
captured the attention of the general public as a result of numerous high-
visibility enforcement actions59 but none more dramatically than the Jus-
50 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
51 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
52 FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); Palmer v. BRG of
Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
53 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
54 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
55 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
56 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
57 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
58 California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
59 Beyond the already mentioned $500 million fine extracted in its vitamin cartel case
and its pending Microsoft monopolization case, the Justice Department has in the last few
years won a considerable amount of national news coverage for its wide-ranging conspiracy
prosecution of Archer-Daniels-Midland and other competitors in the food additives industry,
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tice Department's monopolization suit against Microsoft Corporation.
The public is divided between Microsoft defenders aghast at the notion
that the antitrust laws would attack the most successful and innovative
enterprise of our day60 and Microsoft detractors aghast at the prospect of
one firm's control over all of the ramps to the information superhighway
and over the whole emerging electronic commerce world. Close observ-
ers appreciate the fact that the case does not challenge the manner in
which Microsoft initially acquired its monopoly power over PC operat-
ing systems; rather, it is about Microsoft's maintenance of that power
through exclusionary practices aimed at impeding the growth of rival
software platforms and Microsoft's extensions of that power into domi-
nance over a host of related markets and technologies. Even among
those who believe Microsoft's conduct crossed the line from aggressive
competition to unlawful predation, there is spirited debate over the most
appropriate antitrust remedy: a mere injunction against the continuation
of anticompetitive acts or a breakup of the company into several pieces. 61
There is fundamentally nothing new about these issues. Ninety-five
years ago, part of the public was aghast at the notion that the antitrust
laws would attack the most successful and innovative enterprise of that
day-The Standard Oil Company, the firm responsible for developing
the world-changing petroleum industry and bringing the bright light of
kerosene into homes throughout the nation and the world. A larger part
of the public feared the raw power of this Leviathan and cheered the
Government on. John D. Rockefeller was simultaneously attacked as a
predator who killed off rivals by selling kerosene at too low a price and
its war against the Lockheed-Martin/Northrop-Grumman defense industry merger, its now-
pending restraint-of-trade case against both VISA and Mastercard credit card systems, and its
now-pending predatory pricing case against American Airlines, among many other enforce-
ment actions. The FrC over this same recent period has garnered considerable national media
coverage of its precedent-setting prosecutions of Toys-R-Us for strong-arming toy manufactur-
ers into keeping popular toys out of discount outlets and of Mylan Labs for cornering the
supply of a key ingredient in several generic drugs and thereby enabling as much as a 3,200
percent increase in the price of its products; its wars against Staples' attempt to acquire Office
Depot and proposed mergers among the four largest national drug wholesalers; and its recently
settled monopolization case against Intel Corporation, among many other enforcement actions.
Of course, both agencies also garnered considerable publicity and controversy over decisions
not to challenge some of the largest corporate consolidations of our day, e.g., the Justice De-
partment's clearance of the Bell Atlantic-NYNEX merger and the FTC's clearance of the Boe-
ing-McDonnell Douglas merger.
60 Recall Judge Hand's admonition that "the successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins." United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
61 Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems and a strong supporter of the Govern-
ment's case, told Congress that the remedy should include prohibiting Microsoft from acquir-
ing any other technology companies: "Allowing Microsoft to acquire smaller technology
companies is akin to Standard Oil buying up all the gas stations in the U.S." THE WASHING-
TON POST, June 17, 1999, at E-9.
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as a robber who fleeced consumers by selling kerosene at too high a
price. Bill Gates surely sees himself as victimized by similarly contra-
dictory charges-predation because his internet browser has been bun-
dled into the operating system without added charge and robbery because
his operating system is overpriced. In the Supreme Court 89 years ago,
the critical remedial issue was whether an injunction against bad prac-
tices would be sufficient or a breakup into several firms was the only
way to bring competition to the petroleum industry. The Supreme Court
reached the latter conclusion.62
Of course, these comparisons can be attacked as superficial and
even disingenuous, ignoring vast differences between the state of the
world 90 years ago and the state of the world today. Modem debunkers
of antitrust policy emphasize that we now live in a world driven by vast,
interconnected "network" industries with intense and healthy rivalry to
capture "first-mover" advantages in what are inherently "winner-take-
all" markets. In this view, antitrust law should not intrude into contests
for dominance over any given market "space"; today's leader can be
quickly displaced by tomorrow's young upstart. The Microsoft case
highlights this argument as Microsoft denies it possesses any degree of
"lasting" monopoly power and claims its position in operating systems is
now threatened by emerging competition from a host of directions in-
cluding from hand-held devices and web-based applications. One close
observer framed the central question as follows: "Do the antitrust laws
have a place in the digital economy, or are they obsolete, destined to join
Soviet-style central planning on the proverbial 'ash heap of history' ?"63
There are rumblings among some Republican leaders in Congress
that would suggest a negative answer to the first part of that question.64
On the other hand, among prominent members of the antitrust commu-
nity quick to respond with a resounding "yes" to the first and "no" to the
62 The two largest parts of the Standard Oil empire-Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey and
Standard Oil Co. of New York-thereafter became Exxon Corporation and Mobil Corporation.
The FTC recently allowed Exxon and Mobil to reunite, albeit subject to a consent order requir-
ing diventiture of overlapping operations. See Exxon Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24, 677
(FTC Nov. 30, 1999).
63 Eisenach, Forward to Eisenach & Lenard, COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND
THE MICROSOST MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE
(1999).
64 See June 23, 1999, 'E-Contract" promulgation by House Majority Leader Dick Armey
on behalf of self-described "High-Tech Leaders of Congress" (emphasis in original): "The
regulatory and legal framework of yesterday will not fit the economy of tomorrow .... Exces-
sive government intervention threatens future growth and prosperity for this nation .... We
should be careful about allowing anti-trust law to become an excuse for bureaucratic interfer-
ence with innovation and competition. When federal agencies use heavy-handed tactics to
target specific companies, the real message they send to the marketplace is this: You could be
next." As we have seen, the pace of innovation is so quick that today's market giant often
fades into the background in a matter of months."
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second part of that question has been none other than Chicago School
Champion Robert Bork who in his role as consultant to a coalition of
Microsoft antagonists has been a forceful supporter of the Government's
Microsoft case. Others responding in like manner are (a) David Boies,
distinguished defense counsel for IBM against the Government's monop-
olization charges throughout the 1970s but more recently lead counsel
for the Government in the Microsoft suit; and (b) Franklin Fisher, distin-
guished economist and star expert witness in IBM's defense 25 years ago
more recently now star expert witness for the Government in the
Microsoft suit.65
Another strong supporter of the prosecution is Senator Orin Hatch,
among the most conservative Republicans in the Senate and in many
respects a modem-day version of Senator John Sherman. As Senator
Hatch has noted, "Microsoft has made no secret of the fact that it has
made dominating the Internet space a corporate priority." In his view, if
the Internet is controlled by one company and the Internet becomes a
critical underlying medium for commerce and the dissemination of news
and information, "we will be hearing calls from all comers for the heavy
hand of government regulation-for a new 'Internet Commerce Com-
mission."' In short, he admonished, "vigilant and effective antitrust en-
forcement today is far preferable to the heavy hand of government
regulation of the Intemet tomorrow. '66
65 Mr. Fisher provided one of the most dramatic moments during the Microsoft trial last
year. Microsoft's counsel, on cross-examination, challenged Fisher to explain what is harmful
about Microsoft's decision to "give away" Internet Explorer without any charge. Fisher re-
sponded that, while a "free" browser may be easy to accept, "'This case is not about being
easy. If Henry Ford had a monopoly, we'd all be driving black cars." Voice slowly rising, he
continued that "that's not what competition is about. That's not what helping consumers is
about. If Microsoft forced upon the world one browser, that would be really simple." Mr.
Lacovara (counsel for Microsoft) said "Now you seem agitated." "I am agitated," Fisher shot
back. 'I feel strongly on this point. We're going to live in a Microsoft world. It may be a nice
world, but not a competitive world."" Steve Lohr, N.Y. TIMES, January 8, 1999, at C-1.
66 0. Hatch, "Antitrust in the Digital Age," Chapter 2 at 26 in Eisenach & Lenard, COM-
PETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE
DIGITAL MARKETPLACE. Robert Pitofsky expressed this same point in a broader context
20 years ago in his essay on the political content of antitrust policy generally: an "overriding
political concern is that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under
antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy
so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a
more intrusive role in economic affairs." Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust,
127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1979). See also id. at 1057-58: "If a few companies were to grow to
dominate most of the major product markets in the United States, it is inconceivable that those
companies would be left free of political accountability. ... Eventually such companies surely
would come under direct governmental control. An antitrust system that occasionally disre-
gards claims of efficiency, as in the imposition of per se rules against certain kinds of horizon-
tal cartels or unwillingness to take dubious evidence of efficiencies into account in judging the
legality of mergers, reflects these political concerns."
SHIFrING SANDS OF ANTITRUST POLICY
Beyond pros and cons of the Microsoft case itself, FTC Chairman
Robert Pitofsky and a prominent staff colleague have eloquently elabo-
rated upon what they see as the need for "heightened antitrust scrutiny"
of today's leading high-technology industries "to be certain that eco-
nomic growth is not compromised by the abuse of private market
power." They note that historically "the process of industry-building,
from railroads and oil to communications and computers, draws the at-
tention of those charged with protecting competition"; that "the antitrust
laws apply as equally to high-tech as other industries, but high-tech in-
dustries impose some special challenges" for enforcers due to a number
of characteristics that make competition different from that observed in
traditional smokestack industries; in some respects, however, the differ-
ences call for more rather than less antitrust intervention because they
can make "market power more durable." 67
Antitrust Division Chief Joel Klein has also forcefully joined this
debate. As he observed in remarks to a bar association two years ago,
"the issues raised by antitrust enforcement in high-tech industries are not
nearly so new as some may think. Ironically, perhaps the most novel of
the phenomena that tend to characterize the software industry in particu-
lar-i.e., the strong presence of network effects-would appear to war-
rant increased antitrust concern over certain kinds of monopolistic
practices, because network effects can make it especially difficult for a
new entrant to penetrate the market."68
In a speech to the National Consumers League last May, Mr. Klein
urged consumer advocates to focus more energy on antitrust issues in the
years ahead. As he explained on that occasion, electronic commerce and
information technology will raise "enormous issues" for consumers and
antitrust enforcement will be vital as the information economy replaces
smokestack industries. "The opportunity for abuse of... new technol-
ogy is great," he warned, and for this reason antitrust policy "is going to
be critical to consumers in the 21 st Century." He lamented that most
people do not understand that "everything we do in antitrust-whether
we get it right or wrong-is consumer driven"; that "our interest is to
protect what the economists call consumer welfare."69
67 David Balto and Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and High Tech Industries: The New Chal-
lenge, XLII Antitrust Bulletin 583, 583-585 (1998). See also Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Anal-
ysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19' Century Discipline Addresses 21' Century Problems,
Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Section Workshop on High-Tech Industries (Feb. 25, 1999)
(Scottsdale, Arizona).
68 Joel Klein, The Importance of Antitrust Enforcement in the New Economy, Address at
the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 29, 1998).
69 Klein Spurs Consumer Action to Address Challenges of Information Age, Glabaliza-
tion, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Report (BNA) 559 (May 20, 1999).
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Importantly, however, Klein at that point in his remarks defined
"consumer welfare" in a manner quite different from that sponsored by
Robert Bork and his crowd 25 years earlier: "the more people chasing
after the consumer, to serve him or her better, to get lower prices, to get
new innovations, to create new opportunities-the more of that juice that
goes through the system, the better." Finally, he offered his own sum-
mary of the past 40 years of antitrust history: in the 1960s government
"challenged everything," even combinations that would have created
new industry synergies and consumer benefits; in the 1980s, the govern-
ment allowed too much consolidation to occur; but the antitrust "pendu-
lum" on his watch had swung back to the "middle" where "big is not
necessarily bad" but government prudently cracks down on anti-con-
sumer deals and practices. 70
CONCLUSION
Thirty-six years ago, Richard Hofstadter published a provocative es-
say entitled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" 71 There he
described the antitrust movement as "one of the faded passions of Ameri-
can reform"; observed that antitrust had "become almost exclusively the
concern of small groups of legal and economic specialists who carry on
their work without widespread public interest or support"; bemoaned that
antitrust was no longer an "ideology" and had aged into a bureaucratized
program; and concluded that this evolution illustrated how antitrust pol-
icy, "after two generations of noisy but seemingly futile agitation, [had]
been quietly and effectively institutionalized. '72 I suspect Hofstadter
would revise his thesis in some respects were he here to revisit it today.
While passions may have faded by the time of his essay, they came back
to life a decade later as the Chicago School revolution began and they
then intensified throughout the 1980s. Passions are evident in today's
debate over the Microsoft case and more generally over the role of anti-
trust policy in the new economy.
While antitrust, moreover, certainly remains an "institutionalized"
enforcement program,73 it is seriously underfunded and understaffed.
70 See id.
71 Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the American Antitrust Movement, in THE
Busnqrss ESTABLISHMENT (Cheit, 1964), reprinted in RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID
STYLE mI AmERIcAN PoLrncs 188 (1965) (in revised form).
72 RICHARD HOFSrADTER, What Happened to the American Antitrust Movement, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AmERIcAN PoLITcs 188, 194, 235-36 (1965).
73 But see H.R. 1789, the "Market Process Restoration Act of 1990," which would repeal
all of the antitrust laws, introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on May 18, 1999, by
Congressman Ron Paul of Texas. Among the premises are that (a) the antitrust laws "govern-
mentally facilitate interference in the voluntary market transactions of individuals;" and (b) the
Sherman Act "was a tool used to regulate some of the most competitive industries in America"
and "was used as a political fig leaf to shield the real cause of monopoly in the late 1880's-
SHIFmrING SANDS OF ANTITRUST POLICY
This is particularly evident in the struggle of both enforcement agencies
to cope with today's dramatic and unprecedented wave of mergers that
are restructuring the entire world economy.74 In this environment, a new
public interest organization-the American Antitrust Institute ("AAI")-
has emerged with the objective of promoting support for increased anti-
trust enforcement resources and a more activist enforcement agenda.75
The AAI may well qualify as an advance guard for the rebirth of antitrust
as a "movement" in the sense Hofstadter meant by that term. Its founder
and president, Albert Foer, published a report last year on "The Federal
Antitrust Commitment: Providing Resources to Meet the Challenge."
His opening lines capture the essence of his thesis: 'The modem Ameri-
can political economy is based on the idea of competition. But competi-
tion does not automatically occur and it cannot be maintained without a
national competition policy and appropriate institutions for sustaining
competition. '76
Foer might have added that a continuation of sound and effective
antitrust policy cannot be assumed and there is considerable unpredict-
ability in how it evolves in the decades ahead. Much depends on polit-
ical and funding support from the Congress, the predilections of future
appointments to the Supreme Court, and the caliber of successors to
Messrs. Pitofsky and Klein at the enforcement agencies. I don't believe
it is an exaggeration to say that how all three branches of government
respond to today's and tomorrow's antitrust issues will have a significant
impact on the health of our economy and the overall character of our
society.
This writer has no crystal ball but is nonetheless convinced that an-
titrust policy directions of the sort we have seen in the last half decade
will continue to the benefit of the country as a whole for several decades
to come. There surely is plenty of room for further reform: the merger
protectionism." In introducing this legislation, Congressman Paul explained that "Microsoft,
Alcoa and Standard Oil represent cases of a sole supplier, or at least come close to such a case.
However, totally unlike the cases of exclusive government franchises, their position in the
market [is or was] the result of their successful free competition." Claiming that even propo-
nents of antitrust prosecution acknowledge the foregoing, he quoted the Supreme Court's Stan-
dard Oil decision of 1911 (endorsing the breakup of that monopoly) as follows: "Much has
been said in favor of the objects of the Standard Oil Trust, and what it has accomplished. It
may be true that it has improved the quality and cheapened the costs of petroleum and its
products to the consumer." 145 CoNG. REc. 72, EIOOI-02 (daily ed. May 18, 1999) (Statement
of Rep. Ron Paul).
74 The number of mergers annually reported and reviewed by the enforcement agencies
increased from 1,529 in 1991 to 4,728 in 1998. The total value of U.S. mergers completed in
1998 exceeded $1.2 trillion, almost one-seventh of the gross domestic economy of the United
States.
75 I am pleased to be on the AAI Advisory Board.
76 Albert Foer, The Federal Antitrust Commitment: Providing Resources to Meet the
Challenge 1 (March 24, 1999) <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org>.
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review process is often far more burdensome than necessary, both to the
parties and to the Government; antitrust class actions too often become
monumentally abusive tools for extortion that line lawyers' pockets de-
spite the absence of any substance to the underlying allegations; virtually
all kinds of antitrust litigation-government and private alike-take too
long and cost too much; there are many remaining doctrinal anomalies
and inconsistencies that both the Supreme Court and the lower courts
need to address with more wisdom and sophistication. The antitrust sys-
tem will address and resolve all of these problems, albeit not to the entire
satisfaction of all affected parties, in due time.
Our national leaders of all stripes rightly applaud our three centuries
of commitment to both individual freedom and the collective responsibil-
ity for it that we call democracy as it has evolved to our present day.
Antitrust policy has been part of that commitment for half our existence
as a free country and must continue to be part of it as we march forward.
It is fundamentally about preservation of the freedom to compete and
become the next Microsoft; freedom to innovate and change the world in
the process; freedom of choice in our role as consumers of every product
and service that enriches our lives; and, in the end, freedom from both
intrusive government and private monopolies.
A wise philosopher said that "[l]ife is lived forward but understood
backwards."' 77 If this is true, then my wish for the country is that archi-
tects of future antitrust policy will have studied American history during
their formative years under professors of Robert Huff's ilk and will
thereby appreciate the past on which they build.
77 Soren Kierkegaard in The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical
Fragments (1846). Kiekegaard, like Hofstadter, understood the critical importance of "pas-
sion" as a supplement to reason. "An age without passion has no values" and "leads to a
general state of apathy" whereas "the passionate use of thought has consequences ... and
provokes action." See generally L. Skitol, The Speculative Wonder of the Leap of Faith (Re-
flections on Kierkegaard) at 4-9 (1999).
